Racism as “the Nation’s Crucial Sin”*: Theology and Derrick Bell
George H. Taylor**
At the heart of Derrick Bell’s work lies a conundrum. He argues that racism is
permanent, and yet at the same time he insists that the struggle against racism remains
worthwhile and valuable. A number of critics find Bell’s thesis about racism’s permanence to be
so despairing that, on its own terms, it renders any meaningful possibility of action against
racism totally unavailing.1 My goal, by contrast, is to try to make sense of the paradox that lies
so deep at the core of Bell’s work and thinking and assess how the possibilities of action can
coexist with racism’s perdurance. While a number of scholars in this post-civil rights era have
turned to the social sciences to address why racism remains so persistent,2 I want to draw upon
possible insights from theology. Theological analysis may provide a separate source of insight
into not only racism’s persistence but what Bell types its permanence. And theology may
illuminate how it is possible to acknowledge racism’s permanence and still engage in action
against it. My reference to theology takes the form of an analogy drawn from Christian
theology, in particular from the work of the twentieth century American Protestant theologian,
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Reinhold Niebuhr.3 At the core of Niebuhr’s depiction of Christianity too lies a paradox: sin is
an inextricable structure of human life, and yet human action remains meaningful. As in Bell,
the paradox is not overcome; the paradox of the juxtaposition of sin and action is one that has
challenged Christianity since its origins. My claim is that the dynamics of the relation between
sin and action may illuminate the dynamics of the relation between racism and action.
It is not necessary to my argument that racism be shown to be ontologically sinful, sinful
as an actual, ultimate fact. The argument therefore requires no belief in the reality of the
Christian doctrine of sin, although many may believe racism is indeed sinful as that term is
understood doctrinally. My thesis is a more modest one: there is a resonance between the
depiction of sin and the depiction of racism, a resonance at the level of lived experience.
Whatever the ultimate reality of sin, its characterization of the experience of human life usefully
illuminates the experience of racism; it helps capture the reality of that experience.4 Further, the
lived experience of what it means to understand sin and yet be able to act may usefully inform
what it means to experience racism and yet also act. To argue for a resonance between sin and
3

I will rely on Niebuhr’s principal theological work, The Nature and Destiny of Man, as well as an earlier
major work, Moral Man and Immoral Society. See 1-2 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN
(1941; 1943) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN]; MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY
(1932) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY]. My analysis has benefitted from a most
important new commentary on Niebuhr: LANGDON GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR: A THEOLOGICAL STUDY (2001). One of
the pleasures of my graduate education was the opportunity to attend Gilkey’s class lectures on Niebuhr.
As my research was ending, I came across the only other article of which I am aware that probes a similar
interest in the relationship between Niebuhr and the persistence of racism thesis. See Davison M. Douglas, Reinhold
Niebuhr and Critical Race Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 149 (Michael W. McConnell
et al. eds., 2001). While the present article, as the text goes on to discuss, considers the affinities between the
paradoxes of sin and action and of racism and action, Davison’s attention lies in an element of that relationship: the
support Niebuhr provides to an understanding of why racism persists. Davison concentrates more on Niebuhr’s
social theory; I will elaborate more the details of Niebuhr’s theology. Davison also discusses critical race theory in
general, while my comments focus specifically on the work of Bell. These differences in our attention do nothing,
of course, to undermine my appreciation for Davison’s insight into the relevance of Niebuhr for understanding
critical race theory. His thesis helped confirm that I too might be on the right track.
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To be more formal, the analysis is then phenomenological–the experience as lived–rather than
ontological–the experience in its more ultimate reality.
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racism rather than some identity may as well be more true to Bell’s work. As I will explore,
Bell’s religious background and religious faith permeate his work and provide him a deep source
of his resilience.5 This faith, which commentaries on Bell have not sufficiently assessed, seems a
key element of Bell’s belief in the availability and merit of action despite racism’s permanence.
So the resonance seems very strong between Bell’s call to action in the face of racism and the
theological call to action in spite of sin. And yet despite the prevalence of religious vocabulary
in Bell’s writings, the topic of sin itself little appears, a topic I shall also probe.6 Hence the
argument is one of the resonance between racism and sin rather than their identity, and my title is
on theology and Derrick Bell rather than Derrick Bell’s theology, which would imply that the
theology discussed here is necessarily Bell’s own.
Part I develops Bell’s thesis that racism is permanent, an ineradicable structure in
American life.7 Bell’s stance here is unrelenting and a direct and deep challenge to liberal
notions of racial progress. This section draws out the social facts Bell provides about the status
of blacks in American society8 and examines Bell’s argument for the continuing disparity
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See infra text accompanying notes 277-96.
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Of special interest, of course, are those points where Bell uses the term “sin,” as in the passage referred to
in this article’s title. See infra note 298.
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Like Bell, I restrict analysis to racism in American life rather than speculate on the condition of racism
more globally.
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Following Bell, I retain his primary emphasis on the divide between blacks and whites, rather than on the
divides(s) between whites and other people of color. Bell is certainly aware of the multiplicity of racial divides in
this country. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 191
(1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM] (discussing the internment of Japanese Americans during World
War II). He is also very much aware of the multiplicity of oppressions that individuals may undergo–“sexism,
classism, homophobia, and other forms of oppressions”–and that, as “a good deal of the writing in critical race
theory stresses . . . oppressions are neither neatly divorceable from one another nor amenable to strict
categorization.” Id. at 144-45. See infra text accompanying notes 319-25 (developing Bell’s discussion of the
divide between black men and black women). Nevertheless, Bell’s predominant emphasis is on the divide between
blacks and whites, and this Article replicates that emphasis.
As the Article will only begin to suggest, while a primary interest lies in developing the distinctive vantage
point and insights that Bell offers, I am interested as well in what might be the distinctive vantage points, insights,
and, indeed, theologies–see infra note 296–that might be offered by those of other racial backgrounds. Richard
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between the races, particularly the claim that whites hold on to a property in whiteness. Part II
analyzes Bell’s call for action despite racism’s permanence. Part III develops Niebuhr’s
theology of the possibility of action despite sin. Niebuhr too criticizes the liberal–and liberal
theological–belief in continuing progress; for Niebuhr, evil is not overcome. Part IV returns to
Bell and assesses his religious orientation and the degree it may be receptive to Niebuhr’s
theology. Part of the assessment here will be whether Bell’s stance is more existential rather than
theological. Part V concludes by examining some of the larger implications of Bell’s thesis: the
continuation of deep structures that resist characterization simply as social constructions.
Reference will be briefly drawn to the contributions of Bell and critical race theory to a
movement beyond nonfoundationalism.9 Because the Article intends to offer additional grounds
for the comprehension of Bell’s conundrum–that racism is permanent and yet must be
continually fought–the goal is understanding, not criticism. I hence assume Bell’s thesis
throughout.

I. The Problem: Racism’s Permance
A. Bell’s Thesis
Bell’s thesis is direct and searing: “[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible
component of this society.”10 This thesis of “the permanence of racism” is asserted as the

Delgado, for instance, argues that one of the limitations of Bell’s analysis is, precisely, its “binary” emphasis on the
divide between blacks and whites, an emphasis that limits attention to the possibilities of more polycentric,
collaborative action between peoples of various colors. See Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit–Fit to
Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 306-07 (2000).
9

See infra text accompanying notes 374-83.
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subtitle of his book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well11 and is reiterated in the title of several of
his articles.12 In Faces at the Bottom of the Well,13 Bell’s attack is emphatic and unremitting:
– “[R]acism in America is not a curable aberration . . . .” (x)
– “[R]acial problems . . . grow more intractable with time.” (xii)
– “Black people will never gain full equality in this country.” (12)
– “[R]acism is a permanent component of American life.” (12)
– “[R]acism is a permanent part of the American landscape.” (92)
– “[O]ppression on the basis of race returns time after time-in different guises, but it
always returns.” (97)
– [R]acism is permanent, the ultimate betrayal . . . .” (108)
– “[R]acism lies at the center, not the periphery; in the permanent, not in the
fleeting . . . .” (198)
– “[W]hite society would never grant blacks a fair share of the nation’s benefits. . . .”
(241).
– “[T]he common thread in all civil rights strategies is eventual failure.” (248)
The message permeates Bell’s corpus. While Brown14 mandated the end of state-sponsored
segregation, no other decision is society “increasingly willing to commemorate, and less and less
11

See supra note 8.
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See, e.g., Derrick Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Reveloation or Unconscious
Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571 (1993) [hereinafter Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis];
Racism is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 HOW. L.J. 79 (1991) [hereinafter Bell, Racism is Here to Stay]. Also hardhitting is the title of Bell’s book prior to FACES AT THE BOTTOM, see supra note 8, which is called AND WE ARE
NOT SAVED. See supra note *. The title refers to a lament from Jeremiah: “The Harvest is past, the summer is
ended, and we are not saved.” Id. at 241. Yet while this lament highlights that racial justice has not occurred, a
point distressing enough in itself, the tenor at this time in Bell’s writing is not necessarily that racial justice will
never occur.
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willing to follow.”15 The song “We Shall Overcome” remains a civil rights anthem, but “the
contrary teachings of racial history, combined with the ever-more troubling realities of the
present, now intrude every more rudely and insistently on the dream.”16 The repeated force of
Bell’s thesis pummels and washes over the reader with the intensity of an insistent stream.
The severity of Bell’s indictment is perhaps most keenly reflected in his fictional
chronicle, The Space Traders,17 Bell’s best-known18 fable. There Bell offers the story of alien
visitors to the United States who promise the country wealth, environmental decontaminants, and
alternatives to fossil fuel. The gifts will assure the country’s prosperity for the foreseeable
future. There is only one catch. In return for the gifts, the space traders want to take home all of
this country’s blacks. After significant debate, the nation votes conclusively for the trade. The
country does not decide on the basis of what is moral or right but on the basis of protection of
white self-interest. Racism is so powerful and abiding a motivation that it overcomes resistance
to a vote approving a deep injustice. Bell reports that significant majorities in his lecture
audiences agree that were such a vote actually to be taken, the result would agree with that in the
fable.19 And a number of blacks have related to Bell that were the choice made available to
them, they would choose to go. “Knowing what they know, they say, ‘Better risk the unknown
15

DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 49 (1998) [hereinafter BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES]. See
also id. at 133 (“Because the mesh of racism is so woven into the nation’s essential fabric, I am convinced we can
never eradicate it.”); id. at 134 (“[E]ven those gains we consider rock-solid can be taken away in a moment.”).
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Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis, supra note 12, at 572. See also id. at 573 (“[R]acism is an
integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society.”).
17

See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 158-94.
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See Derrick Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 902 (so stating)
[hereinafter Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?].
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Derrick Bell, After We’re Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 393, 405 (1990). Admittedly, Bell’s audiences are self-selective, but it is not clear how that cuts. Are they
predisposed to be sympathetic to Bell’s arguments, or are they predisposed in favor of a belief in racial progress?

6

in space than face the certainty of racial discrimination here at home.’”20 The trade presented in
the fable is unsettling precisely because it is not so fantastical as it might first appear.21
B. The Evidence
Bell’s thesis is undeniably forceful, but what evidence does Bell provide in support?
Does Bell simply dismiss the changes in the laws and behaviors affecting blacks? It is most
significant for comprehension of the deep substance of his thesis that he does not. He
acknowledges “[t]angible progress,”22 particularly the removal of formal barriers that maintained
segregation. We no longer see signs assigning public facilities by race.23 Millions of blacks are
registered to vote and do vote. Nationally, several thousand blacks have been elected to public

The racial composition of his audience may play a factor in this determination, but even here the correspondence is
not uniform.
20

DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME 32 (1996)
[hereinafter BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS]. The statement occurs in the context of another of Bell’s fables, but the
inference is that the statement is factual. In the original Space Trader fable, Bell has a character argue during the
convocation of “The Anti-Trade Coalition”: “Outside civil rights gatherings like this, the masses of black people–
those you claim to represent but to whom you seldom listen–are mostly resigned to the nation’s acceptance of the
Space Trader’ offer. For them, liberal optimism is smothered by their life experience.” BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 174.
21

See Derrick Bell, Black History and America’s Future, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1179, 1191 (1995)
[hereinafter Bell, Black History and America’s Future]. Other commentators argue that the space trade is not at all
fantastic but instead replicative of actual events in American history. See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles,
My Grandfather’s Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 425, 429 (1990) (“Not only have Blacks been enslaved, as the Chronicles sorrowfully notes, but other racial
groups have been conquered and removed, imported for their labor and not allowed to participate in the society they
built, or expelled when their labor was no longer considered necessary.”) (citing the Cherokee removal from
Georgia, the importation of Chinese workers and then the Chinese Exclusion laws, and the importation of Mexican
laborers under the Bracero Program, id. at 430-39); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle of
the Space Traders: Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color if the Price Were Right?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 321,
323-24 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle] (same); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell
and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 941 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado,
Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform] (discussing the removal of Japanese Americans during World War
II). In the context of his fable, Bell also discusses the removal of Japanese Americans during this war. See BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 191.
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BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 5. See also id. at 73 (“Much has changed.”); BELL,
AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 165 (“Even the most determined pessimist must acknowledge the change
in the racial landscape in the last century.”).
23
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office.24 These are changes that “seemed at one time impossible to achieve.”25
And yet . . . . How deep-seated are these changes? To what degree are they fundamental
rather than at the surface?26 Has the structure of racism altered? Bell recognizes progress, and
yet, he insists, “nothing has changed.”27
What does Bell mean? His response occurs at two levels. First, despite the entrance of
certain blacks to the middle and professional classes,28 the actual economic plight of blacks as a
class is no better than it was and may be worse. Second, the structure of racism persists. As to
the first, the figures are dire: black unemployment has been twice that of whites; black income
has been a little over half that of whites; joblessness has ravaged not only individuals but their
families and their larger communities;29 one-third of young black men are either in prison or in
the hands of the criminal justice system;30 more black men are in prison than in college.31
Brown’s32 promise of integrated education remains unfulfilled.33 Schools are now more
segregated than they were three decades ago.34 The courts are increasingly resistant to claims for

24

Id. at 92.
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Id. at 232.

26

See, e.g., id. at 93 (discussing that changes such as increases in black voting “are more cosmetic than

27

BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 22.

real”).
28

Bell will argue that these individual advances in fact have relieved societal pressure for the advance of
blacks as a class. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60 & note 59.
29

See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 5. For an earlier statistical picture, see BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 45-48.
30

See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 15.

31

See id. at 150. See also id. at 151 (“black men are suffering a genocide-like demise from the work-force,
from the family and, increasingly, from life itself”).
32

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

33

See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 162.

34

See Greg Winter, Schools Resegregate, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at A14 (citing a new
study by Harvard’s Civil Rights Project). See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2443 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
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racial redress.35 In Bell’s view, “we must acknowledge that many, perhaps a majority of black
children are in worse shape today than at any time since the end of Reconstruction, perhaps since
the end of slavery.”36
These facts demonstrate the failures of change. Why then is it that for African-Americans
“nothing has changed”?37 For Bell, the grave facts are not the legacy of slavery or evidence of
some “intrinsic weakness” in blacks themselves; rather, they are integral to a social system
where the subordination of blacks serves as a source of protection for the identity and social
stability of whites. The permanence of racism thesis recognizes racism’s “deepest roots.”38
Racism is not a lingering vestige of a historical past; it is a present, ongoing system of
subordination.
Bell has come to identify this continuing system and structure of racism as dependent on
the effects of a property right in whiteness.39 The property right in whiteness asserts an

dissenting) (observing that “[n]eighborhoods and schools remain racially divided” and citing, among other evidence,
the Harvard study. (Id. at 2443 n.4.)).
35

See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 59.
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Derrick Bell, Public Education for Black Children: A Future Role for Dramatic Crisis, in QUALITY
EDUCATION FOR ALL IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? 25, 30 (1994) [hereinafter Bell,
Public Education for Black Children].
37

See supra note 27.
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BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 12.
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To my knowledge, Bell first proposed the concept in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, which dates to 1987. See
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 172. Cheryl Harris later independently developed the concept, see
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1713 n.9 (1993) (noting her separate generation
of the idea), and in his own presentation of the concept, Bell makes frequent reference to Harris. See, e.g., BELL,
AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 175 n.3, 182 n.7; CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN
ARDENT PROTESTER 75 n.5 (1994) [hereinafter BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY]; Derrick Bell, Love’s Labor Lost?
Why Racial Fairness is a Threat to Many White Americans, in Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, Who’s Qualified 42,
46-47 (2001) [hereinafter Bell, Love’s Labor Lost]; Derrick Bell, Racism: A Major Source of Property and Wealth
Inequality in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1261, 1270 (2001) [hereinafter Bell, Racism]; Derrick Bell, Wanted: A
White Leader Able to Free Whites of Racism, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 536 (2000) [hereinafter Bell, Wanted: A
White Leader]; Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Forty-Five Years After the Fact, 26 OHIO N. U. L. REV.
171, 176 n.13 (2000); Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 18, at 904-5; Derrick Bell & Linda
Singer, Making a Record, 26 CONN. L. REV. 265, 270 n.21 (1993).
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entitlement of priority, preference, and privilege over blacks.40 “[T]he set of assumptions,
privileges, and benefits that accompany the status of being white can become a valuable asset
that whites seek to protect.”41 The advantages are economic, political, and psychological,42 and
they accrue to every white whether he or she seeks it or not.43 Whiteness provides an underlying
sense of individual and group identity; whites “bond” on the basis of race.44 A property in
whiteness offers a vested right in a superior status.45 Blacks, by contrast, have a caste-like lower
status; they are different, less worthy.46
Whites deal with racial issues by ultimately protecting their property right in whiteness:
they act not out of altruism or morality but in self-interest.47 If white interests conflict with racial
justice, white self-interest prevails.48 As Bell has argued since at least 1980, racial change occurs
only as a matter of “interest convergence”: “The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality
will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”49 This is true even

In earlier work such as AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, Bell also uses a somewhat different vocabulary to
describe whiteness, appropriating Manning Marable’s concept of the “‘ideological hegemony’ of white racism.”
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 156 (quoting Marable).
40

See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 9, 55.

41

Derrick Bell, [Dissenting Opinion], in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185,
188 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter Bell, Dissenting Opinion].
42

Id. at 185.

43

BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 13.

44
Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 39, at 540 (citing bell hooks). See also BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 155 (“all whites are bonded–as bell hooks says–by racism”) (emphasis added).
45

See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 137.

46

Id. at 95.

47

See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609,
1611-12 (1988) [hereinafter Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival] (“racial reforms in law reflect less a lateblooming civic virtue than perceived changes in self-interest . . . .”).
48

Bell, Love’s Labor Lost, supra note 39, at 44.

49

Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 523 (1980). See also BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 53 (“blacks gain little protection
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in such heralded decisions as Brown.50 There, for instance, protection of the United States’
image abroad during the cold war was vital to the arguments in favor of the Supreme Court’s
ultimate holding.51 The Brown decisions also reflects a second element of Bell’s interestconvergence thesis: not only is a court’s holding dependent on white self-interest, but so is its
enforcement. Brown II’s holding that redress of segregated education should proceed not
necessarily immediately but with “all deliberate speed”52 is, says Bell, an “unprecedented
deferral of a recognized constitutional right.”53 Further, not only is the courts’ enforcement at
stake because of white self-interest; so also does this self-interest spawn white resistance to the
courts’ original holdings.54 Civil rights litigation has placed too much emphasis on winning a
case and too little on its actual impact.55 Even if a case is won, its goals will be ignored,
circumvented, or negated if they challenge existing claims of white entitlement.56 “[T]he
traditions of racial subordination are deeper than the legal sanctions.”57 Any reforms that arise as

against one or another form of racial discrimination unless granting blacks a measure of relief will serve some
interest of importance to whites”).
50

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

51

See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 116-19 (citing, among other authorities, Mary L.
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988)).
52

Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).

53

BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 118.

54

See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 108 (“If [a] self-interest approach is a valid
explanation for the change in constitutional interpretation . . . then why wouldn’t the same self-interest have to be
present before that decision could be implemented?”).
55

Id. at 54. Of additional interest here in Bell’s attention to implementation is his appropriation–for his
more progressive purposes–of analyses drawn from law and economics, a field stereotypically viewed to be
conservative or libertarian. The most direct evidence of this appropriation arises in Bell’s narrative, The Racial
Preference Licensing Act, see BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 47-64, where Bell creates a fictional
scheme to tax enterprises that choose to remain discriminatory. See id. at 54 n.* (citing the work of law and
economics scholars Richard Posner and John J. Donohue).
56

See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 53 (ignored); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *,
at 248 (circumvented); Bell, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 41, at 186 (negated).
57

BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 191-92.
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a result of civil rights litigation must cohere with white self-interest.58 Even though some
individual blacks may have advanced due to the abandonment of formal barriers, these advances
may actually serve more general white interests. These advances ironically serve to enhance
rather than undermine social stability.59 They serve as “proof” that racism is no more, is dead.60
“[P]rogress in American race relations is largely a mirage, obscuring the fact that whites
continue, consciously or unconsciously, to do all in their power to ensure their dominion and
maintain their control.”61
Part of Bell’s great frustration and deep disappointment is that his interest-convergence
thesis suggests that whites low on the economic ladder might have sought alliance with blacks in
similar conditions. That, however, has not occurred.62 Rather than recognize and work together
with similarly situated blacks to redress the commonality of their plight, whites at the economic
bottom identify with whites at the economic top and blame blacks of a class similar to their own
as the source of their problem.63 There is no greater sign of the power of whiteness as a property

58

See id. at 63.

59

BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 48. See also id. at 131-32 (“Instead of gaining access to
real influence, it is more likely that we [blacks who have gained some stature] are legitimizing a system that
relegates us to an ineffectual but decorative fringe.”).
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Bell explores this theme in his fictional narrative, The Chronicle of the Amber Cloud. See BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 162-65. In this Chronicle, the amber cloud’s descent caused wealthy white
adolescents to be stricken with the personality of poverty-ridden youth (e.g., lethargy, withdrawal, insecurity). An
expensive cure was developed that the nation was willing to pay. But when the request came for nonwhite youths
also to be treated, the nation refused. As Bell relates, this Chronicle “undermined [his] theory that progress for
blacks might evolve out of a national crisis endangering whites as well as blacks.” Id. at 165.
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See Bell, Racism, supra note 39, at 1270-71. See also Derrick Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1691, 1693 (1995) (claiming that the goal of racism is “to divide and alienate along racial lines those similarly
subordinated as a means of maintaining the economic and political advantages held by well-off whites”).
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right. Whites not at the economic top act against their best interests.64 Because of their racial
bond, they place themselves “‘in the dominant circle–an area in which most hold no real power,
but only their privileged racial identity.’”65 Whiteness as a property right is an essential element
of American social stability.
The barriers to moving beyond reliance on an out group for social stability are
monumental in a nation where whites of widely divergent stations are able to
make common cause through their unspoken pact to keep blacks on the bottom.
No other aspect of social functioning has retained its viability and its value to
general stability from the very beginning of the American experience down to the
present day. Because of this fixation, I agree with Professor Jennifer
Hochschild’s assessment that racism is not an anomaly, but a crucial component
of liberal democracy in this country. The two are historically, even inherently
reinforcing. In effect, the apparent anomaly is an actual symbiosis.66
The progress of blacks in the courts and in society has not advanced but been stymied.
Bell’s work directly challenge two liberal beliefs: first, that society (and the courts) progress in
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BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 8. See also BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra
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in power.”); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING
INFLUENCE 199, 206 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect]
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(1988)).
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Bell, Racism, supra note 39, at 1270 (citing JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA:
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984)). See also Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12,
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an inherent, evolutionary direction toward equality,67 and second, that education–education about
the plight of African-Americans–leads to change.68 The evidence that Bell adduces demonstrates
that the belief in evolutionary racial advance is but “naive belief.”69 It is a belief that the
evidence contests and refutes. And the character of whiteness as a property interest has proven
resistant to racial education: the pull of racial self-interest, bond, and power has been too strong.
“[V]iewing racism as an amalgam of guilt, responsibility, and power–all of which are generally
known but never acknowledged–may explain why educational programs [about race] are
destined to fail.”70
Racism is permanent. The progresses that have been achieved–the ending of formal
racial barriers, the advances of certain individual blacks in education and in material and social
condition–were expected to signal racism’s end, but they have not. Instead, they have exposed
beneath this surface “a more sophisticated and more invidious vehicle for maintaining white
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See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 47. Sociologist Karl Mannheim described the
liberal humanitarian utopian view as “the belief that reality moves continually towards an ever closer approximation
to the rational,” a belief that “sees the world moving in the direction of a realization of its [liberal] aims.” KARL
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 223, 224 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans., 1936) (Harvest ed.).
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See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 150, describing:

our long-held belief [that] education is the key to the race problem. You know . . . education leads
to enlightenment. Enlightenment opens the way to empathy. Empathy foreshadows reform. In
other words, that whites–once given a true understanding of the evils of race discrimination, once
able to feel how it harms blacks–would find it easy, or easier, to give up racism.
For Mannheim, the liberal humanitarian utopia focuses on the power of the idea and its experience through
education. See MANNHEIM, supra note 67, at 219, 228. The belief in education as a tool of reform is of course one
shared by many who make education their profession.
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BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 155. In an article published in 2000 entitled Wanted: A
White, see supra note 39, Bell repeats the language quoted to explain why the title’s plea will not be satisfied:
“[V]iewing racism as an amalgam of guilt, responsibility, and power, all of which are generally known but never
acknowledged, may explain why educational programs undertaken by the leader I seek are destined to fail.” Id. at
540.
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dominance.”71 Even as many of “the exposed tentacles of the evil we fought” have been lopped
off, “the true evil, the deeply felt need of so many whites to maintain priority status over blacks,
[has] manifest[ed] itself in a myriad of new forms.”72 Bell discusses racism as akin to a
gyroscope. Individual advances may occur, but the gyroscope always returns to its initial
equilibrium. Our society, says Bell, is the “motivating force” of the gyroscope’s movement,
even as it seems “to operate by an internal energy source.”73 Bell invokes Bartok’s opera,
Bluebeard’s Castle,74 as a metaphor for the hazards facing American blacks.75 In the story,
Judith marries Bluebeard and hopes to humanize him. She beseeches Bluebeard to let sunlight
into his dark home, but he refuses. Because of her efforts to open up his home, he ends up
locking her away.76 In Bluebeard’s protection of his dominance and domain, Bluebeard’s
response to Judith is similar to American society’s to its blacks: “Nothing can enlight this
castle.”77

II. The Possibilities of Action
As Bell is only too aware, his indictment that racism is permanent can have a shattering
impact on readers and listeners who had hoped for racism’s end. “If racism is permanent,” he is
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BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 128. See also Derrick Bell, Law, Litigation, and the
Search for the Promised Land, 76 GEO. L.J. 229, 233 (1987) (“[T]oppling rigid racial barriers may have been a
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asked, “then isn’t struggle hopeless?”78 How persist, how act when Bell’s message appears to be
one, as he himself writes, of “futility and defeat,”79 “bleakness,”80 and “despair,”81 a
“revelation[] of distilled woe?”82 This is the conundrum at the heart of Bell’s work and of this
Article. Bell insists that racism is permanent, and at the same time he also insists “that
something must be done, that action must be taken,”83 that the fight against racism must continue
to be waged.84 How is action possible?
A. The Virtues of Necessity
As an initial matter, Bell’s thesis of racism’s permanence has the effect of an acid bath: it
cleanses, it reveals the truth. An essential element of Bell’s effort is “to make people see,”85
make them “see the racial world as it is.”86 His work describes; it describes what society has
done and, given the structure of racism, it is likely to do.87 Bell’s posture here reminds me of
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BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 248.
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See, e.g., id. at ix.
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See id. See also id. at x (“[M]y conclusions about racism are less radical revelation than disquieting
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what philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls “the destructive hermeneutic,”88 the destructive method of
analysis and interpretation. The task is one of demystification;89 the false idols must be broken.90
The core of the method, though, is not skepticism but recognition of necessity.91 “The positive
benefit,” writes Ricoeur, “of the ascesis required by a reductive and destructive interpretation [is]
confrontation with bare reality, the discipline . . . of necessity.”92 The corrosive bath of Bell’s
thesis of racism’s permanence lays reality bare; it strips away our illusions. To lay reality bare is
a virtue unto itself. We now know and must acknowledge with what we are faced.93
But this virtue of necessity is only one part of its value. Once we sweep away the debris
of the false idols, we can also assess what it may be possible yet to affirm. “Destruction . . . is a
moment of every new foundation.”94 Confrontation with necessity is salutary. As Bell writes,
“[W]e risk despair as the necessary price of much-needed enlightenment. Facing up to the real
world is the essential prerequisite for a renewed vision, and for a renewed commitment to
88

PAUL RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 237 (Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart eds., 1978)
[hereinafter RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR]. More famously, Ricoeur calls this the hermeneutics of
suspicion. See PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 33-35 (Denis Savage
trans., 1970) [hereinafter RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY].
89
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supra note 1, at 535 (“It is when Bell is deconstructing formal equality and rights rhetoric that his arguments are
most persuasive.”).
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93
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struggle based on that vision.”95
B. Action as Protest
Action that has faced the discipline of necessity takes three forms in Bell’s work and life.
The first is action as protest.96 Action here recognizes reality–including the reality of racism–but
challenges it, protests it, defies it, even as this action understands that it will likely end in defeat.
“Our lives gain purpose and worth when we recognize and confront the evils we encounter–small
as well as large–and meet them with a determination to take action even when we are all but
certain that our efforts will fail.”97 The point of action as protest is not necessarily to win but to
act with ethical integrity.98 The action–win or lose–has its own dignity. The virtue comes in the
very acts of engagement, commitment,99 and struggle.100 The action provides its own
satisfaction,101 its own sense of affirmation102 and rightness.103 While the confrontation with
reality may be despairing, the triumph comes in the continuation of the act, the maintenance of
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the struggle, the refusal to accede.104 “In effect, then,” Bell writes, “failure is inevitable, and
there need be no failure.”105
Further, although the act as protest may not result in policy change, it may have other
benefits in addition to those it has for the actor. As the act calls others to account, it can expose
the integrity or lack thereof of others’ actions; it can reveal hypocrisy.106 Just as Bell requires of
himself and other sympathizers that they confront reality, so the act of protest challenges its
opponents–usually unsuccessfully–to confront the reality of their own position. More positively,
protest may create a “magnetic field” that extends its power and influence beyond its original
domain.107 Others may be inspired by the protest to take up the cause or similar causes;108
others, more modestly, may be moved to support those who engage in direct protest action.109
And the act may inspire others to act in the future and find succor in the lineage of those who
have gone before.110
C. Action as Racial Realism
The second form action takes in Bell’s work and life is as “racial realism.”111 A hallmark
of racial realism is the claim that the fight against racism should pay less attention to ethics and
104

See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 161 (citing ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF
SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS (Justin O’Brien trans. 1955) [Vintage ed.]) [hereinafter CAMUS, THE MYTH OF
SISYPHYUS]). In Part IV.A infra, I return to examine at greater length the existentialist character of Bell’s work.
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Harvard protest).
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example of his predecessors in the fight against racism).
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more to economics.112 Racial realism accepts the present reality of blacks’ subordinate status
and argues that only economic change will provide redress to poverty, joblessness, and other
similar ills. The traditional civil rights view that law, through effectuation of racial equality,
would lift blacks out of their economic condition has failed.113 The prototypical example of
Bell’s realism is his long-standing resistance to Brown,114 its enforcement, and its continued
advocacy by the civil rights community. From at least 1976, Bell has consistently–and,
obviously, quite controversially–insisted that the educational focus for blacks should not be on
school integration but on quality education.115
Bell’s writings provide some quite provocative models of how economic change could
occur. Bell argues, for example, for recognition of “entitlement to basic needs–jobs, housing,
health care, education, security in old age–as an essential property right of all.”116 Elsewhere, in
his fictional narrative, The Racial Preference Licensing Act,117 Bell proposes a plan of “[r]acial
realism” that “does not assume a nonexistent racial tolerance, but boldly proclaims its
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commitment to racial justice through the working of a marketplace. . . .”118 Relying on work in
law and economics,119 Bell’s plan provides that business establishments that wish to discriminate
should be permitted to do so, but must pay a tax, and the tax would go to support black
businesses and other efforts in the black community.120 In another story, Racial Royalties,121
Bell proposes that companies that draw on “African-American music, dance, dress and
hairstyles, language, and so forth” would be charged a royalty fee that would be funneled into
urban redevelopment.122
There is, of course, a certain self-admitted irony in Bell’s advocacy of these actions as
racial “realism.” On the one hand, they do act on the basis of economics, not ethical pleadings,
and Bell is certainly quite emphatic that only economic acts will actually lead to the
improvement of black social conditions. The agenda within the black and civil rights
communities must, he argues, come to reflect this change in attention. And there is some
possibility of economic action becoming effective on the basis of self-help,123 including
organized protests and boycotts.124 But as Bell is also aware, his proposals will run into
resistance, both from the civil rights community125 and from whites.126 Bell remains serious
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about the goals of economic change, both on the basis of black self-help and the possibility–even
if remote–of support from working-class whites.127 More generally, Bell’s efforts at racial
realism are thought experiments that attempt both to raise the consciousness128 of his readers and
listeners and to urge the movement beyond failed, traditional approaches and the examination of
any possibilities whose potential can be exploited.129
D. Action as Writing
These last reflections move us to the third form of action in Bell’s work and life, the
action undertaken by his writings130 themselves. If racism is permanent, is there any point to
Bell’s labors to bring his writings before the public? Doesn’t writing fail to maintain the
discipline of necessity: the recognition of racism as indeed permanent? Doesn’t writing assume
the liberal conceit that Bell otherwise seems to criticize: that education will lead to
enlightenment, enlightenment will lead to empathy, and empathy will lead to reform?131 In part,
Bell’s response lies along lines already addressed: that he must be true to himself and faithful to
the truth of his message. “We’re a race of Jeremiahs, prophets calling for the nation to
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See, e.g., Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past, supra note 116, at 81 (noting resistance to the campaign
for basic entitlements “from many whites who will be its principal beneficiaries of its success”).
127

Analogizing to the efforts undertaken by Jesse Jackson in his run for the presidency, Bell advocates an
educational campaign whereby “working-class whites [may be] willing to learn what blacks have long known: that
the rhetoric of freedom so freely voiced in this country is no substitute for the economic justice that has been so long
denied to whites as well as blacks.” Id. As observed in the prior note, see supra note 126, Bell on the same page
expresses awareness consistent with his understanding of whiteness as property, see Part I infra, that many white
beneficiaries of his proposal will resist it. In the text, I go on to suggest how Bell reconciles the “reality” of his
proposal to the likelihood of his success.
128

See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 62.

129

See id. at 60.

130

For present purposes, Bell’s lectures and other oral presentations should be understood to be included
within the rubric of the not quite adequate term, his “writings.”
131

BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 150 (quoted previously at note 68 supra).

22

repent.”132 In part, though, Bell also acknowledges–throughout his work–that his message may
fail. A few lines down from the sentence just quoted, Bell continues: “About the least dire fate
for a prophet is that one preaches, and no one listens; that one risks all to speak the truth, and
nobody cares.”133 And even if the prophet has listeners, prophecy may lead not to conversion but
to resistance.134 Elsewhere Bell recalls his late wife Jewel’s admonition that “trying to teach the
white folks” was folly.135 Bell recognizes as well the quixotic character of fighting with words
against structures of oppression and economic and political power.136
Yet there is a deeper purpose to Bell’s writings also, one that does not reject the
limitations just raised but carves out its own space nevertheless. This deeper purpose has three
elements. First, as with other writings of a comparable perspective, Bell’s stories can provide
“understanding and reassurance” for those, such as many blacks, who have walked a similar
path.137 Bell’s truth-telling is the telling of their stories. These “counterstories” at the same time
132
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contest majoritarian stories and “strike a chord” with the ready listener.138 The stories can
provide a sense of “homeland” in readers’ minds and hearts.139 By contrast, for those readers,
mainly white, who have not trod Bell’s path, Bell’s writings–particularly the fictional narratives–
serve a second function. The narrative form invites readers to suspend judgment and belief, so
that they may be more open to the reality of the views expressed,140 even as their prior reality is
disrupted.141 The story may be revelatory: both as an unmasking–you claimed to hold to the
truth of equality but did not–and as the announcement of a new truth.142
Does the possibility of an announcement of a new “truth” conflict with Bell’s thesis that
racism is permanent? It may well, and at this crux we (and Bell) confront the deepest
dimensions of the abiding paradox in his work: that racism is permanent, but action is possible.
At one level, Bell’s writings demand that we confront what is. And yet at another level they
open us to what may be.143 Racism is elemental to “what is,” but we do not know what “may
be.” Bell does not want to discard or escape his thesis of racism’s permanence, and yet he has
hopes for the future. This is an indissoluble tension. Bell’s work has a “transformatively
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aspirational concern.”144 His work is disruptive both to challenge what is and to open the way
for what may be.145 He does not know what may be, but the disruption may spark revelation.146
He does not intend, for instance, for his fictional proposal of a racial preference licensing law to
be enacted, but the shock generated by its perspective may cause an opening beyond traditional
views.147 The shock may generate contemplation and exploration of new alternatives.148 Bell
wants to open the way for new, real but yet unknown possibilities.149
E. Action: Not By Morality Alone
Revelation of new possibilities is necessary, but more than revelation is required if
change is to be actual and effective. New truths will be resisted.150 Here we return to Bell’s
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criticism of the liberal model–the assumed progression from education to enlightenment to
empathy to reform.151 The appeal to morality–that change should occur because it is the right
thing to do–is insufficient.152 In part Bell’s response here is due to his experience with the
failure of “morals-policing” laws, including Brown.153 Compliance is not voluntary, and it is
difficult to enforce.154 Recognition must be had that society acts on the basis of self-interest155
and power.156 Racial realism acknowledges that change will not occur “until blacks become
insistent or . . . political or economic conditions dictate. . . .”157 Reliance on faith and hope is not
enough; their fulfillment requires works.158 Over seventy years ago, the following statement
appeared:
It is hopeless for the Negro to expect complete emancipation from the menial social and
economic position into which the white man has forced him, merely by trusting in the
moral sense of the white race. . . . However large the number of individual white men
who do and who will identify themselves completely with the Negro cause, the white

intellectual solution may be as deserving of recognition as faith that our humanity will not always be subordinated
because we are not white.”).
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race in America will not admit the Negro to equal rights if it is not forced to do so. Upon
that point one may speak with a dogmatism which all history justifies.159
As evident, the conclusion is one with which Bell agrees, and it is one that he has quoted
favorably.160 The statement appeared in 1932 under the hand of American Protestant theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr. As we seek more completely to understand Bell’s work, it is worthwhile to
consider whether Niebuhr’s theology–and the paradox it maintains between the permanence of
sin and the possibility of action–can inform our comprehension of Bell’s paradox–the
permanence of racism and the possibility of action.

III. Niebuhr’s Theology
Niebuhr’s major theological work was produced during the 1930’s and early 1940’s.161 It
was written against the backdrop of–and responded to–the aftermath of World War I, the
Depression, social and political unrest, and the sweep of history toward World War II. In his
important new book on Niebuhr,162 theologian Langdon Gilkey writes:
In a turbulent epoch when evil often appeared to be dominant, Niebuhr’s theology
seemed to present the possibility of a social realism that maintained its moral
nerve and did not become either cynical or despairing, even when self-interest
appeared to rule everywhere. Since the optimistic base for creative work for
justice was now gone, the question was: How is it possible to have hope and to
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maintain the struggle for justice in a world so filled with self-interest?163
Three elements of this appraisal deserve our attention. First, already we sense a strong resonance
between Niebuhr and Bell. Although each writes in a different historical epoch, a similarity of
themes predominates: the perdurance of evil and self-interest and, regardless, the struggle for
justice and the drive toward new possibilities, Niebuhr in the form of “social realism,” Bell as
“racial realism.” Second, as I now turn to discuss, Niebuhr’s theology is a political theology,
and, third, as I will then turn to, it is a theology that–like Bell’s work–criticizes the liberal
assumption of optimism and inherent progress.
A. A Political Theology
Often the preoccupation of Christianity is viewed to be the individual: his or her own
individual sin, individual relation to God, and individual salvation in a life hereafter.164
Niebuhr’s focus is quite different. His ruling concern as a Christian theologian is social
existence and historical meaning.165 For Niebuhr, “[t]he obligations that faith entails are those
that mainly involve the creation of justice and love in our own historical communities;” the
primary result of sin is not distance from God “but injustice toward the neighbor in historical
time.”166 At the heart of his thought is a “passion for social justice and for historical renewal;”
his theology’s aim is to provide “a foundation for creative action in the world.”167 Niebuhr’s is a
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political theology.168
Like Bell’s fight against the prevailing liberal civil rights doctrine of his era, Niebuhr had
to fight against the prevailing liberal theological and social doctrine of his. Niebuhr, like Bell,
contested what Niebuhr called the “modern optimism [in] a philosophy of history expressed in
the idea of progress.”169 Liberal doctrine did not find evil a serious or persisting problem.170
Niebuhr, like Bell, argued that this optimism was seriously belied by the facts of the world
around him. Liberalism’s failure to attend the seriousness of evil also left it unable to function as
a source of insight, understanding, or possible answer when the facticity and pervasiveness of
evil could no longer be denied.171 Niebuhr’s theology intended to be more responsive, both to
the existence of the problem of evil and to the ways it could be addressed.172 Against liberalism,
Niebuhr revived the concept of sin to understand the nature of evil. In a considerable
168
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transformation of classical doctrine, he reinterpreted the symbol of sin as relevant for social, not
simply individual, life in order to make it pertinent to his world.173 Ironically, as we shall see,
Niebuhr found that liberal doctrine had underestimated the dimensions not only of the “daemonic
misuse” we may make of human freedom but of human freedom itself.174
B. Sin
The doctrine of sin lies at the center of Niebuhr’s thought.175 For him, sin has two
dimensions: vertical and horizontal.176 The vertical dimension of sin consists of “man’s
rebellion against God, his effort to usurp the place of God.”177 Humans attempt to transmute
their partial, finite values and selves into an ultimate good.178 Sin is manifested in the form of
pride, self-love, self-righteousness.179 And it is manifested by humans universally.180 The
lurking, continuing, and destructive presence of sin in all of human life181 is the testament of its
depths and perdurance. Sin is not isolated as the property of the most wicked but is
everyone’s.182 As is well known, the complication for Niebuhr here–as for the history of
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Christian doctrine–is how to explain that sin is universal without also concluding that it is
ineluctable–part of our essential nature183–and therefore outside individual responsibility.184
Niebuhr argues that sin cannot be understood apart from human freedom. “The essence of man
is his freedom. Sin is committed in that freedom.”185 Freedom is wrongly used.186 Sin is a
defect in the will, and the will entails freedom; the defect lies in freedom, not in a destruction by
sin of the human essence.187 Sin is universal but not necessary.188 Niebuhr acknowledges that
the relation between freedom and sin remains paradoxical, something that “cannot be fully
rationalized.”189 Also unexplained is why humans have this “bias toward sin,”190 why each
individual succumbs. The mystery of sin’s origins remains.191
Whatever our assessment of Niebuhr’s description of the vertical dimension of sin, we
need to see its coordination with his understanding of sin’s horizontal dimension. If sin’s
vertical dimension of sin is the human effort to place oneself in the center, the horizontal

GILKEY, SHANTUNG COMPOUND (1966). When I attended Gilkey’s Niebuhr lectures, see supra note 3, the most
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dimension of sin–the “moral and social dimension”–is injustice.192 “The ego which falsely
makes itself the centre [sic] of existence in its pride and will-to-power inevitably subordinates
other life to its will and thus does injustice to other life.”193 Here Niebuhr’s theology as political
comes to the fore. Injustice is an “inevitable concomitant” of pride.194 The will-to-power is both
a form and instrument of the pride that is “sin in its quintessential form.”195 Where there is
unequal power, those in power will use whatever means needed to maintain it and will seek to
justify those means as plausibly as they can.196 Self-righteousness is “responsible for our most
serious cruelties, injustices and defamations” against our fellow humans, as the “whole history of
racial, national, religious and other social struggles” shows.197 The self-righteousness extends to
group identification, including, as Niebuhr says directly, group identification of whites that has
led to rejections of the claims of blacks.198
Whether or not we view as adequate Niebuhr’s account of sin–particular the basis for its
vertical dimension, its universality–two points are worthy of consideration. First, just as Niebuhr
argues that we may understand the nature of sin only by understanding the nature of human
freedom, so he also argues we may understand the nature of human freedom–the ability to act,
the human “freedom of spirit”199–only by understanding the nature of human sin.200 We recur to
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this interrelation when we turn to Niebuhr’s discussion of the possibilities of action.201 Second,
even if we reject Niebuhr’s theology or ontology, does the experience of sin he describes seem
accurate or telling? Whatever its ontological or theological basis, does the experience he
describes–the interrelation of sin and freedom, the pervasiveness of pride, will-to-power, and
self-righteousness–seem true?202 This, to me, is the most important question to ask of our
response to Niebuhr: does his work capture the lived experience? In turn, our question is
whether the lived experience he does capture help us understand what Bell means by the
permanence of racism: something at once pervasive and yet also a matter of human
responsibility.
C. Guilt
Irrespective of whether we accept the ontological or theological dimensions of Niebuhr’s
portrayal of sin, Niebuhr’s account seems to present a problem on its own terms. As Niebuhr
acknowledges, the claim that sin is universal seems to imperil the possibility of social judgment
and action. How judge between individuals or between groups if everyone is characterized by
sin?203 Niebuhr answers by differentiating between sin and guilt. Guilt represents the actual
consequences of sin in the historical, horizontal dimension.204 And, Niebuhr argues, although
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there may be equality of sin, there is inequality of guilt.205 “[T]hose who hold great economic
and political power are more guilty of pride against God and of injustice against the weak than
those who lack power and prestige.”206 The acts of those in power result in a greater number of
unjust historical consequences. They are more guilty.207
White men sin against Negroes in Africa and America more than Negroes sin
against white men. Wherever the fortunes of nature, the accidents of history or
even the virtues of the possessors of power, endow an individual or a group with
power, social prestige, intellectual eminence or moral approval above their
fellows, there an ego is allowed to expand. . . . Its horizontal expansion involves
it in an unjust effort to gain security and prestige at the expense of its fellows.
If we want to pursue justice, we can choose between historical actors and align ourselves with
those having the least guilt.208
D. Possibilities of Action
As we come to understand the functioning of power and self-righteousness in the world,
we recognize the operation of the horizontal dimension of sin in the world and the injustices it
creates. Challenge of and resistance to these injustices signifies one real measure of the real
possibilities of action in this world. Do we humans have a capacity, though, not just to protest
the unjust but to determine the just and work toward its behalf? What is our capacity to know
and do the good? In his response to these questions, Niebuhr returns to his juxtaposition of
205
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freedom and sin and his claim that liberal doctrine had underestimated the capacity of both.209
“Both the majesty and the tragedy of human life exceed the dimension within which modern [i.e.
liberal] culture seeks to comprehend human existence.”210 It is the human spirit’s “yearning for
the infinite” that is “the source of both human creativity and human sin.”211 Humans are sinful
but not solely sinful. Freedom is the basis of sin, but sin is not the whole of freedom.212 The
lessons here are several. First, the fact that sin is not the sum of human existence keeps alive the
possibility of meaningful earthly action; earthly existence is not simply or solely evil.213 Second,
this creativity is part of our earthly freedom: the human capacity for imagination, invention, and
breakthrough, in issues ranging from the sciences to the arts to government to social relations.214
Third, this creativity and freedom coexist with sin, and the realismof social action must
confront the capacities for human sin–power, self-righteousness–in human action. Contrary to
liberalism, social reform will not occur principally due to “the power of education and moral
suasion”215 but will require employment of politics and power.216 Niebuhr calls on the use of
boycotts, for instance.217 Groups in power will not surrender their power voluntarily. Recall
Niebuhr’s comment on the prospect for racial reform: “[T]he white race in America will not
admit the Negro to equal rights if it is not forced to do so. Upon that point one may speak with a
209
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dogmatism which all history justifies.”218 Niebuhr acknowledges the inevitability in human
social action of pressure, tension, and conflict. Acknowledgment of these methods does not and
should not make them normative, but, Niebuhr adds, “neither will we ease our conscience by
seeking to escape from involvement in them. We will know that we cannot purge ourselves of
the sin and guilt in which we are involved by the moral ambiguities of politics without also
disavowing responsibility for the creative possibilities of justice.”219 The creative possibilities
are ours, and we must accept responsibility for their development. So doing, though, will also
require us to act with realism, in recognition both of the use of power by those in positions of
dominance and of the need for exertions of power in response.
The final element of the human yearning for the infinite brings out the full extent of
human freedom. Thus far, the analysis of social realism might suggest that the pursuit of social
“justice” is simply a matter of power versus power. Yet missing is a claim of some deeper
notion of the good that can undergird the claim that action is indeed undertaken on behalf of the
“just” cause. And it is this deeper notion of the good that Niebuhr’s theology especially wants to
articulate. As Gilkey comments, integral to Niebuhr’s argument is a “dialectic of realistic social
analysis on the one hand and transcendent grounds for judgment and hope on the other.”220
Niebuhr wants to establish what it means to labor–in this world, realistically, with the ambiguous
tools necessary–“for higher justice” and will do so “in terms of the experience of justification by
faith.”221 Faith in a transcendent God,222 a sense of “dependence on an ultimate source of
218
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being,”223 provides “a transcendent source of meaning.”224 This transcendent source grounds
human creativity and freedom225 and at the same time acts as a source of judgment and criticism
on all human action as to the finitude of its perspective, its errancy, and sin.226 In the face of the
storms and failures of human existence, including the lack of success in the pursuit of social
justice, this transcendent source provides an “assurance of meaning,”227 an assurance that
meaning and goodness do exist both in general and for us each. It acts as a source of renewal
and hope228 that provide sustenance for our return to the world of action.229
E. The Persisting Paradox
Niebuhr has no doubt that the interrelation he describes between the pervasiveness of sin
and the possibilities of human action–between “fate and freedom”–remains paradoxical.230 And
Niebuhr recognizes that our tendency would be to reject the paradox precisely because it seems
nonrational and absurd.231 He asks us to consider, though, the limits of human rationality and to
be open to the possibility “that a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to a truth which
logic cannot contain.”232 This response is, of course, open to at least two objections: that he has
not provided a good justification for going beyond reason and that his rationale opens the way to
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the propounding of any multiplicity of absurd or paradoxical beliefs. Niebuhr’s defense is quite
a simple one: is not the paradox between sin and freedom that he describes more encompassing
of the facts of our experience than any non-paradoxical account. Loyalty must be to “all the
facts,” to the “complexity in the facts of experience.”233 Think of physicists’ understanding of
quantum mechanics or of light’s being both a wave and a particle. The underlying nature of
either is not clear–indeed seems illogical–yet physicists find quantum mechanics experimentally
workable and light’s character as wave and particle experimentally verifiable.234 Niebuhr’s
theology is not experimentally verifiable, but like nuclear physics, grants priority first to
experience, not the bounds of logic. Again: “a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to
a truth which logic cannot contain.”235
As throughout the discussion of Niebuhr, the effort here is not to assert the truth of the
ontology or theology that Niebuhr presents. The concern is much less with the “categories or
forms” that Niebuhr brings to bear, which are theological in orientation, than with the “content or
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See, e.g., BRIAN L. SILVER, THE ASCENT OF SCIENCE (1998) (describing physicists’ understanding of
light as wave and particle, id. at 393-95, and summarizing the experimental validity of quantum mechanics, id. at
398-99). Writing of quantum mechanics, Silver asserts:
It works every time, but it flouts common sense. . . . How can thousands of scientists use a theory
that has irrational features to it? Because where theoretical results can be compared with
experimental observations, one can only pray that all theories were as reliable. No scientist would
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Id. at 398. Silver goes on to disparage contemporary efforts to analogize from quantum mechanics to the social
sciences and humanities, including religion. Id. at 399-40. My appropriation of the example of quantum mechanics
is, I hope, somewhat different. As the text proceeds to suggest, the point is not to exclude methods of analysis
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materials” of this understanding–sin, freedom–which arise from experience.236 Gilkey asserts
that the “mystery” Niebuhr discusses “is constitutive of real existence . . . and thus is a part of
our experience. As a consequence these paradoxes turn out to make more sense of the
contradictions and puzzles of actual experience (which puzzles also arise from this relation) than
do the coherent systems that delight the mind.”237 What Gilkey asserts, I ask as a question.
Whether or not we agree with Niebuhr’s theology or ontology, do we find his understanding of
human experience “very close to the history we all continue to experience each day”?238 We can
ask this question of ourselves, and for the purposes of this Article, ask it more precisely of Bell’s
work, a subject to which I now return.

IV. Bell, Theology, and Beyond
What are the possible resonances between Niebuhr’s portrayal of human existence and
Bell’s? Does Niebuhr’s discussion of the paradox between sin and action help us better to
understand Bell’s paradox between action and racism’s permanence?
A. Bell’s Existentialism
An initial question is whether Bell’s work is properly situated within a theological
framework. Does the vocabulary of existentialism better capture Bell’s argument?239
Bell does refer several times to the work of the French existentialist, Albert Camus, and
cites Camus for two basic points. First, Camus warns that we must proceed “‘with weapons in
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See infra text accompanying notes 271-76.
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our hands and a lump in our throats.’”240 On the one hand, we must go forward; any attempt not
to act and to remain “pure” will lead to the hurt of others because of our very failure to act. On
the other hand, we must act, even though action may well cause injury to those we had hoped to
assist.241 As we shall return to later, Bell emphasizes the necessity but also the humility of
action.242 Second, and the point to which I here want to draw much greater attention, Bell also
refers positively to Camus’s contemporary appropriation of the myth of Sisyphus. In that myth,
of course, Sisyphus was condemned by the gods to spend every day rolling a rock up a hill, only
to have the rock fall to the bottom, requiring Sisyphus to begin his labors endlessly yet again.243
For Bell and Camus, what is particularly notable in Sisyphus is his conscious adoption of his
destiny. As he turns to go back down the hill and resume his effort, “‘he is superior to his fate.
He is stronger than his rock.’”244 To similar effect, Bell elsewhere cites Camus as someone who
maintained the necessity of struggle even though defeat was certain.245 In Camus’s words, “[t]he
240
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supra note 104, at 89). A similar quotation appears in Bell, Commencement Address, supra note 143, at 470. To
my knowledge, Bell refers to Camus’s Myth of Sisyphus in only one other passage, where his fictional character,
Geneva Crenshaw, criticizes the story narrator that “there is a Sisyphean element that is missing from your current
formulation.” BELL AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 140.
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BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xiv. In this passage Bell goes on to quote from Albert
Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death 26 (Justin O’Brien trans. 1960) [hereinafter CAMUS, RESISTANCE,
REBELLION, AND DEATH]. An identical reference to Camus appears in Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis, supra
no
te 12, at 584. On both these pages in Bell’s work, he also cites to a similar end Franz Fanon’s paradoxical
argument that racist structures are permanent and yet resistance should be maintained, citing Franz Fanon, White
Skin, Blacks Masks (1967). I am aware of only two other places in Bell’s corpus where he cites Fanon, both on
separate propositions than the argument here. See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 141 (noting
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struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart.”246 The struggle may end in
defeat–the rock will again roll down the hill–but the triumph comes in the struggle itself.247
Meaning derives from engagement and commitment, not the end result.248 We recall Bell’s
emphasis on action as protest,249 what Camus calls “revolt”250 or “rebellion.”251
Perhaps the most resonant linkage between Camus and Bell surfaces in Camus’s The
Plague,252 a work that Bell, to my knowledge, does not cite. In that book, a fictional town is
overwhelmed with the plague and, to contain the spread of the epidemic, the town is quarantined;
no one may enter or leave.253 (The book, first published in 1947, is at one level an allegory of
the Nazi occupation during the years of World War II.) The inhabitants experience exile,
deprivation, and great suffering, including innumerable deaths.254 The primary certitudes of the
novel’s protagonists is, first, that they must face their plight, not shut their eyes to it.255 Second,
they must fight–fight the plague and save as many as possible from dying and from prolonged
separation from those outside the town.256 Third, they must fight although victory is never
lasting: the plague means “[a] never ending defeat.”257 The plague never dies but at best simply
246
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becomes dormant and may arise again.258 Fourth, and most soberingly as Camus extends the
allegory, the plague is not just a force external to us but one “that each of us has . . . within him;
no one, no one on earth is free from it.”259 Even those who seek to heal can nevertheless can
injury.260 The tale to be told, Camus writes:
could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record of what had had to
be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never ending
fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions,
by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences,
strive their utmost to be healers.261
The meaning of the plague is “[j]ust life, no more than that.”262 As in Bell, the affliction is
societally pervasive and seemingly inextricable,263 battle must be waged against the pestilence,
and the struggle will never be finally victorious. As Bell’s own appropriation of Camus marks
directly, Bell’s thesis has a patently Sisyphean, existentialist quality.
And yet Bell’s and Camus’s existentialism also diverge. Camus engages in rebellion not
only against human social conditions; his rebellion is ultimately “metaphysical”: a protest
against the human condition in an anonymous universe.264 The universe is anomic: meaningless and heart-less, not in the sense of intentionally cruel but indifferent. The universe is

258

Id. at 278.

259

Id. at 229.

260

Id. at 227. This and the prior quotation come from the mouth of Tarrou, a priest.

261

Id. at 278. The quotation comes from the book’s final page.

262

Id. at 277.

263

I set aside until later the question of whether Bell would ascribe either to himself or other blacks the sin
of racism. See infra text accompanying notes 298-325.
264
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“divested of illusions and lights,” and humanity finds itself there “an alien, a stranger.”265 The
condition of humanity, caught between the need for meaning and the “silence of the world,” is
“absurd.”266 Because the universe has no meaning, the only proper understanding of it is one of
nihilism. And yet Camus wants to go on to declare nevertheless that “it is possible to find the
means to proceed beyond nihilism.”267 The act of rebellion understands the terms of the universe
but does not accept them; rebellion is an act of defiance.268 Battle must be waged against the
indifference of the universe and against the human sufferings within it, even if the task is one
only of reducing the number of evils committed and sufferings undergone, not changing the
universe’s ultimate meaninglessness.269 “[S]truggle implies a total absence of hope (which has
nothing to do with despair, a continual rejection (which must not be confused with renunciation),
and a conscious dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to immature unrest).”270 Human
action causes no rents in the weave of the universe’s anomic fabric but can still have its own
integrity and merit.
When Bell, by contrast, finds value in action as protest, the vocabulary he uses is not
simply existentialist but religious. Even as he reiterates that protest will likely lead to defeat, he
talks of it as “a kind of spiritual salvation,”271 it “can bring an inner triumph of the spirit,”272 in it
265

CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, at 5. Cf. ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Stuart
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“there is the salvation of spirit, of mind, of soul.”273 In part, Bell’s conviction here is that if we
cannot control the fate of others, acting with integrity is an effort to take care of our own
“soul.”274 Yet there is also something more. Unlike Camus’s existentialism, which expresses
defiance in the face of what is viewed to be the ultimate meaningless of the world, Bell expresses
a belief that even if his protest acts in defiance of the realities of the social world, it comports
with the truths of a more far-reaching world.275 Bell remains existentialist, but as I now turn to
explore, his existentialism has a more strongly religious component.276

272

BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xii.

273

BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 177.

274

See id. at 63 (“All we have to do in life is save our souls.”) (citing Alice Walker); id. at 154 (citing Tracy
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fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, where Crenshaw reminds Bell of a Biblical message, although not exactly so
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BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 170-71.
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See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 4 (claiming that his protest actions have “enriched
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Bell’s religious existentialism joins a well-known variant of existentialism, whose major figures include
the nineteenth century Danish theologian, Soren Kierkegaard, see, e.g., SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND
TREMBLING/THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH (Walter Lowrie trans. 1954) and the twentieth century American
theologian, Paul Tillich, see, e.g., PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE (1952). Niebuhr’s theology can also be
described as existentialist. See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 74. A biographer discusses Niebuhr’s “Sisyphean
perspective.” See RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BIOGRAPHY 217 (1985).
Although it would take us too far from our main topic to describe in any great detail Camus’s views on
Christianity that keep his own existentialism relentlessly one of religious critique, a summary of his criticisms is
relevant both for honing the character of his own existentialist posture and for illustrating how Bell’s religion differs
from the religion that Camus challenges. Camus develops at least four overlapping criticisms of Christianity:
1. He rejects the religious stance that looks for salvation in another, nontemporal world,
rather than seeking to act in this one. See, e.g., CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104,
at 113 (“[I]f there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in
hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life.”); CAMUS, THE REBEL,
supra note 240, at 306 (arguing as “the only original rule of life today: to learn to live and to die,
and, in order to be a man, to refuse to be a god. At this meridian of thought, the rebel thus rejects
divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”); CAMUS, RESISTANCE,
REBELLION AND DEATH, supra note 245, at 73 (“If Christianity is pessimistic as to man, it is
optimistic as to human destiny. Well, I can say that, pessimistic as to human destiny, I am
optimistic as to man.”).
2. He rejects the religious avowal that any positive mark on humanity comes from God’s
grace rather than from human action, which Christianity describes as inherently sinful. See, e.g.,
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B. Bell’s Religiosity
It has long been apparent in Bell’s writings that religion has been a signal part of his life

CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 245, at 72 (“I was not the one who said
that man was incapable of saving himself by his own means and that in the depths of his
degradation his only hope was in the grace of God.”); CAMUS, THE PLAGUE, supra note 252, at
116 (arguing that no one believes in an all-powerful God as “proved by the fact that no one ever
threw himself on Providence completely”).
3. He rejects the Christian notion of sin. See, e.g., CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS,
supra note 104, at 30 (observing that for Kierkegaard “sin is what alienates from God. The
absurd, which is the metaphysical side of the conscious man, does not lead to God. Perhaps this
notion will become clearer if I risk this shocking statement: the absurd is sin without God.”); id. at
113 (“There are words I have never really understood, such as ‘sin.’”); CAMUS, RESISTANCE,
REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 245, at 73 (“I feel rather as Augustine did before becoming a
Christian when he said: ‘I tried to find the source of evil and I got nowhere.’”).
4. Perhaps most profoundly, Camus rejects a God who permits evil and allows deep
human suffering to occur. See, e.g., CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra note 240, at 24 (“The
metaphysical rebel is . . . not definitely [i.e., not necessarily] an atheist, as one might think him,
but he is inevitably a blasphemer. Quite simply, he blasphemes primarily in the name of order,
denouncing God as the father of death and as the supreme outrage.”); id. at 303 (“Even by his
greatest effort man can only propose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But
the injustice and the suffering of the world will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they
will not cease to be an outrage.”); CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 245,
at 71 (“I continue to struggle against this universe in which children suffer and die.”); CAMUS,
THE PLAGUE, supra note 252, at 196-97 (“until my dying day I shall refuse to love a scheme of
things in which children are put to torture”). For someone such as Camus writing in the aftermath
of the Holocaust and World War II, the immediacies of evil and the sufferings and deaths it caused
were certainly a most stark source of reflection, as those events should continue to be for us all.
In sum, Camus writes that humans must choose between one of two possible worlds: either “the sacred” or
“the world of rebellion”; he adds, “[t]he disappearance of one is equivalent to the appearance of the other . . . .”
CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra note 240, at 21. This choice between one of two alternatives is one that Bell and
Niebuhr reject. Their more detailed rejoinders to Camus I leave largely to the main body of the text, and the
comparison offered there is indirect. Let me offer here just three more direct responses. First, recall that Niebuhr’s
is a political theology: he wants to consider how human action is meaningful for ends in this world, not for some
life beyond. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68. Second, Bell cites Tillich positively for the proposition
that the situation of faith is now (or should be) one where there is no longer “belief in an all-knowing deity” and yet
a “‘courage of confidence’” can be invoked “under which genuine belief can be sustained despite circumstances
tending to destroy it.” BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 42 (citing TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE,
supra). Third, as we have seen, for both Bell and Niebuhr evil is not something that simply happens to humans or
something of which they are simply hosts (as they would be of a plague). They emphasize the volitional character
of human evil; evil is a human act, something for which humans bear responsibility. In Niebuhr’s terms, sin is a
function of human freedom. See supra text accompanying 185. It should bear noting that my brief presentation of
Camus’s views on Christianity and the potential responses to them by Bell and Niebuhr does not attempt to
adjudicate between these figures.
For more extended engagement with Camus about his response to Christianity, see Albert Camus, The
Unbeliever and Christians, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 245, at 67. The quotations above
from this book come from the pages of this essay.

45

and work,277 and this has become increasingly overt in books such as Gospel Choirs278 and
Ethical Ambition.279 Bell has documented his religious upbringing in the Protestant black
church280 and his continuing religious faith.281 He describes himself as Christian, but his faith is
not cabined by traditional Christian doctrine.282 Bell finds Christian literalism to “trivialize the
depths of [the Bible’s] meaning and the universality of its message.”283 The depth of Biblical
meaning fortifies rather than waters down or destroys belief. For Bell, “God is there, even if not
in the form I had long imagined.”284 This faith that takes on the challenges of contemporary
criticism is one that Bell also locates in Niebuhr.285 Bell’s religiosity is finally something not so
much a matter of doctrine but something located in the heart: a deep-seated faith, a core affect, a
guiding belief.286 Particularly revealing of his faith is Bell’s drawing upon the music and
message of the spirituals and gospel hymns,287 what he has often called a “theology in song.”288
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See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 78 (noting this reliance). Bell’s recourse to the
spirituals and gospel hymns is most overt in Gospel Choirs, a book that could be described as an ode to this music.
Quotation of the music permeates the text. See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 1, 4, 17, 27, 28, 29, 49, 60,
73, 74, 91, 103, 115, 141, 145, 152, 164, 171, 174, 188, 203, 206, 209, 210, 212, 213.
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This music provides a “spiritual nourishment . . . a universality that is capable of touchingall
who hear and needs its comfort, its consolation.”289 The message in the music is one of the
sustenance that faith provides: “We’ve come this far by faith.”290 “I don’t believe He brought
me this far, to leave me.”291 “‘Twas grace that brought me safe thus far;/ And grace will lead me
home.”292 “There are some things I may not know,/There are some places I can’t go,/But I am
sure of this one thing/That God is real.”293 A life of faith requires of each individual: “Keep
your hand on the plow. Hold on.”294 Bell’s spirituality295 seems a key to understanding how for
him human action remains vital and viable despite racism’s permanence.296
288
See BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 79; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at
252; Derrick Bell, “Here Come de Judge”: The Role of Faith in Progressive Decision-Making, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1,
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Two points deserve attention here. First is a shift toward spirituality away from religious
denominationalism or doctrine. Second, as I shall briefly return to, see infra note 381, this move toward spirituality
seems one of the significant innovations of critical race theory as a progressive social theory.
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This point is also emphasized by Marcus Bruce: “[T]o define Bell’s work as primarily a ‘racial critique’
is to miss his call for a profound spiritual transformation of American society.” Bruce, supra note 132, at 167.
Bruce additionally quotes an interview where Bell says of GOSPEL CHOIRS that it “addresses the ‘spiritual nature of
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C. Bell and Niebuhr
In assessing the possible analogies between the analyses of Bell and Niebuhr, our initial
question was whether it was proper to place Bell’s work within a theological framework at all.
Having now a better sense of Bell’s religiosity, we can turn more directly and precisely to the
potential relevance of Niebuhr for understanding Bell. To what degree does Niebuhr’s
discussion of the paradox between sin and action help us better to understand Bell’s paradox
between action and racism’s permanence?
Bell’s response to Niebuhr’s claim of the universality of sin (sin’s vertical dimension) is
complex. In part, as we have just discussed, Bell’s theology is more spiritual than doctrinal, so
development of theological categories such as sin may not be of particular interest. In part too,
Bell’s attention is quite evidently directed elsewhere, to what Niebuhr called sin’s horizontal
dimension, the appearance of evil and injustice in the world. We return to this point later.297
More generally, Bell’s writings explicitly employ the term “sin” only rarely,298 although he fairly

Although I can but note the point here, it would be interesting to develop internal to critical race theory
how different religious backgrounds might act as a relevant variable in understanding different critical stances. For
example, recall Bell’s fable of the Space Traders, see BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 158. As
discussed previously, see supra text accompanying notes 17-21, the narrative avows that whites would trade the
nation’s blacks to space traders for promised wealth. By contrast, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic have written
an alternative fable to this chronicle, see Delgado & Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle, supra note 21, and in that
alternative, the outcome is not the dire one that Bell predicts. The account includes the following statement from a
religious denomination opposed to the trade:
All men and women are sons and daughters of one God. We condemn this trade. As Jesus said,
“As you did it to one of the least of my brethren, you did it to me.” This trade would sully a great
nation. On judgment day, the Lord will not look kindly on those who voted for it.
Id. at 325 (quoting Matthew 25:40). My question is whether the religious tradition(s) of Delgado and Stefancic
differ from Bell’s and whether that difference is a factor in the diverging orientation of the stories. See also R.
Randall Rainey, S.J., After We’re Healed: Imagining a Social Order Based Upon a Justice That Reconciles, 34 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 471 (1990) (criticizing, from a Roman Catholic perspective, Bell’s despairing vision).
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See infra text accompanying notes 326-29.
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The most prominent mention of the term comes in the passage quoted in this Article’s title: racism as “the
nation’s crucial sin.” BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 125. Recall that there the reference was to a
belief of Ben Goldrich, a protagonist in one of Bell’s fictional chronicles. Elsewhere in Bell’s texts, the reference to

48

frequently does use the term “evil,” particularly to characterize slavery and racism.299 Bell’s
invocation of racism as an “evil” may seem unsurprising, but it reinforces his point that racism is
not something superficial, occasional, or a matter of perception but rather something deep and
perduring. Bell excoriates the Brown300 Court, for example, because the reprehensible
educational segregation that the Court there held unconstitutional “is a manifestation of the evil
of racism the depths and pervasiveness of which this Court fails even to acknowledge, much less
address and attempt to correct.”301
At the few points where Bell’s work more directly discusses the question of the
universality of sin, it is typically critical. In commenting on another legal scholar’s statement
that imperfection and evil are a heritage shared by all of humanity, Bell remarks: “I have often
heard similar explanations, and they have never eased either the pain or bitterness of racist
policies condoned in a nation that boasts endlessly of its equality and justice.”302 Similarly, he
finds woefully insufficient “confessions of guilt” by those who have engaged in racial
oppression; these confessions do nothing to solve the real economic problems blacks are

“sin” is even more anecdotal. See, e.g., id. at 78 (“I did not want the Senator to get out of paying for all his sins by
drowning himself.”)(statement by Geneva Crenshaw in a fictional narrative); id. at 139 (the “sin of showing up the
rest of society”) (statement in the narrative about Ben Goldrich); Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, supra note 63, at
1695 (“the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah”).
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See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 112 (describing how his law school text on race and
racism treated racial discrimination “as the evil it is rather than a subject . . . examined ‘neutrally’); BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 34 (“evil” of slavery), 37 (same), 41 (same), 42 (“evil of racil discrimination”), 44
(“evil of racism”), 77 (“racial evils”); Bell, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 41, at 185 (“the evil of racism”); Derrick
Bell, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.’s Legacy, 53 RUTGERS L.J. 627, *** (2001) [hereafter Bell, Judge
Higginbotham’s Legacy] (“continuing evils of racism”); Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 39, at 543
(racism as an “evil[] we cannot end”); Bell, Black History and America’s Future, supra note 21, at 1190 (“evils of
racism”); Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, supra note 63, at 1693 (the “real evil, racism”); Bell, The Racism is
Permanent Thesis, supra note 12, at 586 (racism as an “evil[] we cannot end”); id. at 587 (“evil of racism”); Bell &
Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 47, at 1612 (“the evils of slavery and segregation”).
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Bell, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 41, at 185 (emphasis added).
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Derrick Bell, Preaching to the Choir: American as It Might Be, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1032 (1990) (reviewing
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989)).
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facing.303 For Bell, the claim of sin’s universality becomes a vehicle for acquiescence,
accommodation, and inaction, and this message must not be accepted. Niebuhr’s differentiation
of sin from guilt would agree.304 Elsewhere Bell seems not simply to criticize but to reject the
universality of sin as applied to racism, in two senses. First, not every white engages in racism at
least as an intentional action. Although all whites do benefit from racism, Bell writes, “I know
that not all whites are evil or guilty in any normative sense.”305 Second, when Bell rejects black
responsibility for racism, sin seems not universal but an attribute of power: “[T]he fact that, as
victims, we suffer racism’s harm but, as a people, cannot share the responsibility for that harm,
may be the crucial component in a definition of what it is to be black in America.”306 Yet even
though these statements appear to take away from Niebuhr’s account of sin as universal, they
align with Niebuhr in portraying sin and racism as deep structures, something more implacable
than specific individual actions. They may also suggest an element of universality in the sense of
the tainted effects of power no matter by whom it is held. This theme comes across most clearly
in Bell’s fable The Citadel,307 where we learn only at the end of the story that the oppressive
power wielded by the rulers was held by those with “dark skins and thick hair” and used against
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BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 47.
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See supra section III.C.
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Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 39, at 540. See also BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xvi
(“not all whites are racist”).
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Id. at 155. See also Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 39, at 541 (same); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED, supra note *, at 257 (“we find courage in the knowledge that we are not the oppressors . . . .”). In other
statements, Bell suggests that blacks bear responsibility to the extent of refusing to adopt a stance of subordinancy.
See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at xi.
307

Id. at 61-80. In his earlier book, Confronting Authority, see supra note 39, Bell presented The Citadel in small
sections that introduced each chapter. See id. at 1-3, 9-10, 27-28, 49-50, 67-68, 81-82, 93-94, 101-2, 125-26,145-47,
165.
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others, the “lowlanders,” who were “fair-skinned, straight-haired people.” Further, generations
before the situation had been reversed.308
Additional suggestive meditations in Bell’s work about the universality of sin appear in
his reflections on his own activism. As Bell emphasizes repeatedly, he has been quite constantly
aware that his own actions may not only end in defeat or in unanticipated consequences but in
harmful results. “Each action intended to help some will unintentionally harm or disadvantage
others who, as a result of our well-intended efforts, will feel–and may well be–less well off.”309
One of the most vivid and poignant examples of this dilemma arose as a result of Bell’s protest
against Harvard Law School’s failure to hire to its permanent teaching ranks a woman of color.
As Bell recounts, Regina Austin, an African-American law professor, was then visiting at
Harvard, and Bell’s actions were interpreted as in part advocacy on behalf of Austin. Bell had
not consulted in advance with Austin about his protest, which a number of minority women law
faculty resented, and Bell acknowledges the view that the publicity and backlash surrounding his
protest may in fact have eliminated Austin’s ability to gain a permanent position at Harvard and
added significantly to the pressures Austin had to face that year.310 Bell also grants that despite
his good intentions, “[i]t is not difficult to find my failure to consider the effect of my protest on
Regina Austin both selfish and sexist.”311 He as well recognizes that in the eyes of some, his
308

BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note15, at 80; BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 165
(same). In the latter work, the excerpt concludes the book.
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BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 7. See also id. at xii, 185 (same); BELL, AFROLANTICA
LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 62 (“Our most unselfish work may turn out to do harm as great as the injustices we tried
to end.”); BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198-99 (“our actions . . . may indeed, despite out best
efforts, be of more help to the system we despise than to the victims of that system whom we are trying to help”);
Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 36, at 47-48 (“What we have to do, black and white who are
concerned, is to recognize our potential in this society for doing harm even as we seek to do good.”) (question and
answer session).
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actions may have delayed the hiring of women of color for more years to come.312 Bell defends
his actions but knows that they also caused pain and may have led to some unwanted
consequences.313
In other of his work, Bell frequently recurs to a statement made to him by Reverend Peter
Gomes on Bell’s move in 1980 from Harvard to become a dean at the University of Oregon
School of Law. Gomes told Bell that as a dean he would be an evil; he would find himself
rewarding those he should disappoint and disappointing those he should reward. The task was to
become a “necessary evil.”314 As in his comments about his protests, the insight in these
statements may in part be existentialist: action is necessary but if undertaken may lead to the evil
of injuring others we had wanted to assist.315 In part the message may also be an insistence on
humility.316 In part as well the insight may be that in order to act for social justice, tools such as
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Id. at 118. Lani Guinier, who became the first African-American woman hired to the permanent Harvard Law
School faculty, reports that she did reject an invitation to teach at the law school as a visiting professor in 1992, two
years after Bell’s protest began. The school was still embroiled in the issue and, she relates, “I was loath to walk
into the middle of it.” She finally accepted an offer to teach as a visiting professor during 1996, was soon after
invited to join the faculty on a permanent basis, and joined the faculty in 1998. See Nancy Waring, Lani Guinier:
Present and Visible, available at www.law.harvard.edu/alumni/bulletin/backissues/spring99/article3.html.
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See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 114-19. In these pages, Bell’s comments on his protest
may sometimes appear defensive. During the early 1990’s, when I heard Bell introduce a lecture with some
comments on what had happened to Austin, it was apparent that his uppermost response was one of great sorrow
about her pain.
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the repercussions of his protest on Regina Austin, Bell quotes Camus’s statement that we must proceed “‘with
weapons in our hands and a lump in our throats.’” Id. (citation omitted). For a prior quotation of this sentence, see
supra text accompanying note 240.
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power must necessarily be employed.317 It is unclear whether Bell would say that, as a social
actor, he must necessarily employ means that are sinful (sin in the horizontal dimension) and
additionally unclear whether he would also acknowledge that this employment demonstrates
sinfulness in the vertical dimension as well. Somewhat suggestive of the latter are statements
such as: “Power in the hands of the reformer is no less potentially corrupting than in the hands of
the oppressor.”318
One of the areas internal to the black community where Bell has consistently shown
attention to possible “sinfulness” is in the relationship between black men and black women.319
Bell relates of his own education on this subject: “For a long time, I thought race and sex were
separate agendas, but I have slowly come around to agreeing with my women students–white as
well as black–who have been telling me for years that we blacks must deal with sexism and
patriarchy in our communities before we can address effectively the continuing evils of
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See, e.g., McArdle, Interview, supra note 314, at 250 (quoting Bell that the message he tries to convey to students
is that “[a]s lawyers working in the system they are evil, but with real care and even more real humility, they can
from time to time be a necessary evil.”). In a number of other contexts, Bell has surveyed the potential abuse of
power enabled by the attorney role. Civil rights attorneys, for example, may have had one goal–integration–while
their clients had another–equal education. See Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 115. For a more recent
comment on this problem, see Bell, Ethical Ambition, supra note 96, at 161. Bell has also commented on how
advocacy by civil rights attorneys, including himself, has led more to advancement of their professional careers than
to improvement in the lives of their clients. See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 54.
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BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 159 (stated in the context of discussing Gomes’s remark). See also
BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 7 (“While striving to do the Lord’s work, we will look to many
of our adversaries and some of our friends like the Devil incarnate.”) In this quotation, it is unclear whether the
point here is one only of appearance or of actuality. More generally, Bell is not sanguine about the abuse of power
that might occur in any future black-run society. “A black Camelot is not necessarily what you’d get . . . . Look at
Haiti and any number of African countries.” BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 30.
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This subject has received continuing attention in Bell’s work. See, e.g., Bell, Women to the Rescue, in GOSPEL
CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 152-63; The Entitlement, in id. at 188-202 (discussing sexual entitlement therapy); Bell,
The Race-Charged Relationship of Black Men and Black Women, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 198214; Bell, The Sexual Diversion: The Black Man/Black Woman Debate in Context, in SPEAK MY NAME: BLACK
MEN ON MASCULINITY AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 144-54 (Don Belton ed. 1995). Cf. Bell, Shadow Song, in
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racism.”320 Bell both acknowledges that there is black male chauvinism321 and insists that the
problem cannot be reduced to or condoned as a repercussion of the effects of racism on black
men. “[O]ne can’t define right by circumstances. Abuse is abuse.”322 The critique here of black
male actions is very direct and unremitting. And Bell has little doubts about the difficulty of
creating significant change in this context.323 Yet at the same time, Bell does not treat the
problem as “universal” in the sense of ineluctable, a matter of human nature. Through education
and change of will and attitude, black male chauvinism can be reduced.324 The issue again seems
one more of guilt–sin in the horizontal dimension of the social arena–than of sin in the vertical,
universal dimension.325
Whatever the final assessment of Bell’s attitude toward the universality of sin, there is
little question that in his thesis of racism’s permanence he is quite in accord with Niebuhr about
320

BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 154-55. In some of the conversations with his fictional character,
Geneva Crenshaw, Bell acknowledges his need for enlightenment on the topic, as in the following response to the
narrator by Crenshaw: “[S]ome things seem never to change. White folks want to run everything. And you want to
act stupid about women.” BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note*, at 176. For similar statements by
Crenshaw, see, e.g., id. at 69 (“I resent your generalizations about black women.”); id. at 114 (“Thought you would
taunt me into forgetting my question, did you? Black woman, emotional–my foot!”). Bell’s own attitude toward
black women also arose, of course, in his protest over Harvard Law School’s failure to hire to the faculty any
women of color. See supra text accompanying notes 310-13.
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See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 204 (“Black men . . . can be male chauvinists in some of the
worst ways imaginable, as a whole cadre of black women writers have been reporting to the world for years.”)
(citation omitted).
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BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 161. To the charge that many black men are “abusive and macho”
because under the current economic system they cannot find jobs, Geneva Crenshaw replies: “Such abuse deserves
excoriation, not defense!” Id. at 14. See also id. at 198 (“Blaming racism does no good–though racism has
undoubtedly contributed to stresses that lead to negative behavior.”).
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See, e.g., id. at 161 (“Seems gettin’ white folks to give up their racist ways may be a piece of cake compared to
what you’re taking on [i.e., the relationship between black men and black women].”).
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and what he should expect of women has evolved over time.”).
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For Bell the need to stem the corrosive effects of black male chauvinism relate not only to the merits of the
change on their own terms. Black women must also be freed from this oppression because “black people must come
to realize that our greatest strength–our survival hope, if you will–is black women.” Id. at 154-55. See also BELL,
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the manifestation of sin and guilt on the horizontal plane, in the world of action. Little repetition
of Bell’s position about the racist nature of social existence is needed here. As we have seen,
Bell asserts the need to accept “the dilemmas of committed confrontation with evils we cannot
end.”326 He is persistent in his claim that those in power insistently believe that their
“redemption may be gained without surrendering or even acknowledging spoils obtained through
the most pernicious evil.”327 As for the possibilities of his own action, Bell, like Niebuhr,
maintains that his faith requires of him work in this world. A person’s faith must be a “living,
working faith.”328 One of the most oft-cited Biblical passages in Bell’s work is the following
from the book of James: “So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead.”329 As already noted, Bell
also accepts, as part of being a “necessary evil,” the need to act for social justice by employment
of realist tools such as power.
One additional question remains about any possible affinity between Bell’s and
Niebuhr’s practices in the world of action. Would Bell resist a relationship with Niebuhr on
account of the ways in which the latter’s political theology could be applied, including by
Niebuhr himself? As we have seen, due to Niebuhr’s account of the universality of sin, Niebuhr
exempts no social entity or individual from criticism.330 On the other hand, on the horizontal
plane of social action Niebuhr differentiates between levels of guilt and argues a lesser evil

AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 46 (reiterating his “belief that black women will ultimately save our
people”).
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supra note 15, at 58-59; GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 101; BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at
108; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 44.
330

See supra text accompanying notes 177-82.

55

should fight against a greater.331 Because of this complex stance, Niebuhr is appealed to as an
authority by figures across the political spectrum: from progressives criticizing the existing order
to conservatives defending policies as the lesser of present evils.332 On the horizontal plane of
his own time, Niebuhr was a cold warrior, strongly anti-communist.333 Niebuhr objected
strenuously to communism’s “utopianism,” which allowed its leaders to employ any means in
the short-term for the prospect of reaching the ideal goal. Communist utopianism failed “to
acknowledge the perennial moral contradictions on every level of historical advance.”334 The
question raised back to Niebuhr is whether his realist ethic would ratify, under the guise of being
the lesser evil, policies such as the use of atomic bombs, the war in Vietnam, or more
contemporary American foreign policies.335 In part the question is what policies did Niebuhr
himself endorse,336 in part what did and does his realist ethic permit, regardless of Niebuhr’s own
beliefs.337 The debate is between those on one side who argue that Christian realism provided
“‘the religious rationale for the military foreign policy that created the contemporary American
331
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empire’”338 and that it remained “complacent about democratic processes in advanced industrial
society”339 and those on the other side who maintain it stayed “as critical of the cynicism and
amorality and conservatism of post-war Realists as it was of the illusions and moralism of prewar liberals, pacifists and idealists.”340
We cannot resolve that debate here, but some relevant consequences devolve from the
very fact of the debate’s continuance. The debate illustrates the different choices that can be
drawn from Niebuhr’s political theology and ethic, and that insight is elemental to Niebuhr’s
realism. Niebuhr recognizes that religion has been rightly subject to the charge of having a
“fanatic zeal” and wants to adopt the critique to fanaticism in any form. Fanaticism itself is the
“more universal human corruption.”341 Niebuhr warns that humans “are infected by a universal
inclination to make more of themselves than they thought” and therefore should be “distrustful of
their own virtue” and “skeptical about their apprehension of the truth.”342 In an insight
challenging for all historical periods, including our own, Niebuhr admonishes: “The selfdeception of the righteous, whether godly or godlesss, is the chief engine of evil in the world.”343
Just as for Bell, the task Niebuhr sets is one that urges action in the world rather than removal
from it, that understands that its action may require the use of power to fight other power, but
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also appreciates that its actions must be undertaken as a “necessary evil,”344 with humility, selfawareness, and self-criticism. The continuing challenge, of course, is that these stances are
easier to voice than to implement rigorously in practice, as internal criticism and external
objection and debate may reveal.345
The most salient place to examine Niebuhr’s application of his method lies in his
approach to American racism, and let me conclude this inquiry into Niebuhr’s practice by
amplifying his position here. As previously noted, Bell cites positively Niebuhr’s insight that
whites will not grant blacks equal rights as a matter of morality but only if forced to do so.346 It
is notable that this statement appeared in Niebuhr’s early work Moral Man and Immoral Society,
which dates to 1932,347 long before the civil rights movement gained national prominence.
Black civil rights remained an issue of significant attention also in Niebuhr’s later work. He
argued there that the disparity in rights and economic success between whites and blacks was not
simply a vestige of past wrongs but a difference reinforced in our contemporary period.348
White Americans have had “a complacent self-satisfaction” about American democracy,349
344
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believing that our country would solve problems of racial justice over time simply as a matter of
our “moral idealism.”350 But the effort to provide blacks equal citizenship “was bound to prove
more difficult than even the most realistic idealists imagined,” for humans remain “unregenerate
tribalist[s].”351 Because of the stubbornness of these “tribal prejudices,” the struggle for racial
justice would be long and arduous.352 Niebuhr’s formulation here, of course, recalls Bell’s
characterization of whiteness as a property right.353 Niebuhr endorsed the civil rights activities
of Martin Luther King,354 and he urged that it was grossly mistaken for the country to prioritize
military expense in the “futile war” in Vietnam particularly while at the same time the needs of
the black community were not being met.355 “After almost two centuries of broken promises and
pledges our debt to our Negro minority is immense and obvious, and its burden lies heavy upon
our conscience.”356
After discussing possible points of comparison between Bell and Niebuhr on the
horizontal plane of social action, one last source of potential resemblance remains, and that lies
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on the vertical plane of their respective faiths. If Niebuhr finds in his faith a transcendent ground
of meaning,357 so does Bell. Bell frequently quotes the following passage from Patricia
Williams:
“[B]lacks always believed in rights in some larger, mythological sense–as a
pantheon of possibility. It is in this sense that blacks believed in rights so much
and so hard that we gave them life where there was none before; held onto them,
put the hope of them into our wombs, mothered them, not the notion of them; we
nurtured rights and gave rights life. . . . This was the story of Phoenix; the
parthenogenesis of unfertilized hope.”358
At first glance, the statement of “an unfertilized hope” appears existential, not religious.359 As
Bell writes of Williams’ statement, “[O]ur belief in our rights gives them life and thus keeps
alive our humanity whether or not those rights ever materialize.”360 As we have often seen of
Bell, the emphasis is on the “committed struggle.”361 The context seems existentialist because
there is victory regardless whether there is outward success and no matter whether the world–and
the meaning of the world--is indifferent. Struggle can bring “an inner triumph of the spirit even
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as, outwardly, one suffers defeat after defeat.”362 Bell argues that blacks possess “the power of
ourselves. It is the power of right. It is the power that comes when we recognize that our
salvation–not in Heaven, but right here on Earth–comes from a sense of pride in our selfworth.”363 Racism is permanent, but in action and the unfertilized hope, meaning is there.
Yet for Bell this struggle is ultimately grounded in some deeper sense of meaning. It is
Bell’s faith that has provided him sustained nourishment and hope in the face of the frustrations
of working for social reform.
I have relied on my faith. Particularly in hard times, my Christian faith provides
reassurance that is unseen but no less real. It never fails to give me the fortitude I
need when opposing injustice despite the almost certain failure of my action to
persuade those in authority to alter their plans or policies. For me it is my most
powerful resource.364
Bell gleans from the spirituals that enslaved ancestors retained a faith, a faith that was their only
“property.”365 The faith was that “evil and suffering were not the extent of their destiny–or of
the destiny of those who would follow them.”366 This seems Bell’s faith also. He relies, he says,
on what Protestant theologian Paul Tillich has described as “a faith beyond the unbelievable.”367
Despite the permanence of racism and life’s defeats, action and life have meaning, a transcendent
meaning. “I am convinced,” Bell writes, “that there is something real out there in America for
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black people.”368 This faith is a power that he knows has been essential for many in the black
community’s struggle for racial justice, and one that he continues to urge as available and
necessary to sustain future work.369 In the tension between Bell’s thesis of racism’s permanence
and his call for continued action, understanding Bell’s faith provides a final key to
comprehending why this tension is a paradox and not a contradiction. His faith holds out a hope
that both hews to Bell’s realism370 and requires humility371 in acting upon it.372

V. Conclusion
Although Bell seems to maintain some distance from Niebuhr’s understanding of sin’s
vertical dimension, its universality, he and Niebuhr appear much more to share a sense of the
operation of sin in the horizontal dimension, in the earthly world of action where social justice is
sought. And they share as well a confidence in the transcendence of meaning. For each, “[b]oth

368

Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 87, at 378; Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, at 92 (same).

369

See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at xiii (“The righteous must rely on their faith and
champion justice even in a seemingly lost cause.”); BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 11 (“We need a
foundation for new tactics that speaks directly to today’s crisis, one that also encompasses the vehicles of faith and
steadfastness that have served us so well in past struggles.”); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 196
(“[Y]ou . . . are looking for a third approach militant enough to meet the reality of our condition and yet humane
enough to equate with the religious faith that helped sustain us through so many bad times.”).
370

See Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 36, at 37 (“[N]either hope nor faith can make the
impossible real.”).
371

See supra text accompanying note 316. Recall the importance of this humility in Niebuhr also: “[W]e cannot
purge ourselves of the sin and guilt in which we are involved by the moral ambiguities of politics . . . .” 2 NIEBUHR,
NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 284.
372

Bell’s approach can then be described as utopian. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 255
(advocating a “utopian” “Third Way”). Cf. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS, supra note 358, at 254
(discussing the “moral utopianism with which blacks regard rights”). But it is utopian in the careful sense described
earlier as the “exploration of the possible,” not as escape or “the completely unrealizable.” See supra note 149
(quoting RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA, supra note 149, at 310). When this approach retains its
humility, it also avoids Niebuhr’s criticism of utopian ideologies such as communism, which he argued “fail[ed] to
acknowledge the perennial moral contradictions on every level of historical advance.” NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN
REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 334, at 37-38 (previously quoted supra at text accompanying note
334).

62

the majesty and tragedy of human life”373 far exceed the liberal portrayal of human existence.
And for each, the interrelation of sin and action or of racism and action remains paradoxical.
Each seems to suggest, though, “that a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to a truth
which logic cannot contain.”374 As throughout, the issue is less one of ontology than of
experience. Niebuhr’s portrayal of the experienced interrelation of sin and freedom seems to
illuminate the experienced interrelation of racism and action. Diminution of the tension in either
of these interrelations will fail to capture the veracity of their tensions and of the paradoxical
experiences they describe.
The lessons Niebuhr and Bell provide are both substantive and methodological.
Substantively, they contend that human existence is comprised of seemingly deep structures.
Their assertion of these deep structures challenges certain contemporary norms, particularly
those that maintain that human values are simply plastic, simply social constructions that are
nonfoundational, caught within the boundaries of particular cultures.375 The deep structures
asserted in Bell and Niebuhr–deep structures of good and evil–both break these boundaries and
contest nonfoundationalism. Human existence is not simply a “blank slate,”376 with which we
are free to do as we choose. One of the great contributions of Bell and the larger project of
critical race theory of which he is a member is their criticism of nonfoundationalism in law.377
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Against the claim of some in critical legal studies that “rights” are but social constructions that
society can decide to grant or to take away,378 critical race theory argues that “rights”
characterize something more fundamental–a “truth,” a “‘really-out-there’ object[],”379 “a ‘real’
reality out there”380–that provides an anchor, something that can be held onto, during the
storm.381

Methodologically, Bell and Niebuhr argue that it is only through critique–through

confrontation, rather than avoidance, of the deep structures of human existence–that any real
possibility of redemption is rendered available.382 This conjunction of critique and a redemptive
vision is also a dominant thread of critical race theory as a whole.383 Niebuhr and Bell alert us
that there may be more to “[b]oth the majesty and tragedy of human life”384 than we have
recently supposed.
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